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The Global Rightist Turn, Nationalism and Japan
Karoline Postel-Vinay , Sciences Po, Paris  
“How does the wall keep us free?
The wall keeps out the enemy
And we build the wall to keep us free
That's why we build the wall
We build the wall to keep us free.”
“Why  We  Build  the  Wall”,  song  by  Anaïs
Mitchell,  from  her  studio  album  Hadestown
(Brooklyn  Recording  Studio,  New  York  City,
March 2010)
Abstract :  This  article  looks  at  contemporary
Japanese nationalism in the context of growing
far-right movements within democratic societies
around the world, notably in Europe and North
America, and the general rejection of the “happy
globalization”  narrative  that  has  shaped  the
international order since the end of the Cold War.
Japan,  which  witnessed  the  birth  of  the
“borderless world” metaphor in the 1990s, is now
contributing in its own way to the early twenty-
first  century  worldwide  longing  for  strong
borders and an aggressive military posture. The
rise of ultra-conservatism in democratic societies
cannot be reduced to a “Western problem”; by
taking into account the political transformation of
a country such as Japan it is possible to consider
a  truly  global  phenomenon  with  far-reaching
consequences.
Keywords :  Narratives  of  globalization,  Global
far-right, Japanese neo-nationalism, Comparative
nationalism, Identity politics, Pacific War legacies
The Demise of “Happy Globalization”
Walls  –  old  and  new,  disassembled  or
reassembled – constitute a pictorial trope of how
governments  and  societies  have  been  making
sense of global togetherness since the end of the
Cold War.  In  1989,  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  Wall
epitomized the idea of the fall of all walls, an idea
that was central to a new Weltanschauung which
was  power fu l  enough  to  p roduce  an
international and transnational rhetoric about a
world without borders that would be shared by
very different actors, from the global corporation
to the global NGO, and across the planet, from
Berlin  to  Washington  and  Tokyo.  It  led  to  a
“happy  globalization”  vision  that  was  all  the
more emotionally and practically efficient in that
it was sustained by a discursive continuity rooted
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in  the  West’s  engagement  with Perestroika and
embodied  by  American  president  Ronald
Reagan’s  spectacular  injunction  declaimed  in
front  of  the  Berlin  Brandenburg  Gate,  in  June
1987:  “Mr.  Gorbachev,  tear  down  this  wall!”
Echoing its bombastic mood, the German tabloid
Bild declared that it was “a speech that changed
the world”. If hardly a decisive game changer, it
captured the dominant geopolitical spirit of the
time.  That  spirit  inspired  governments  to
participate in a renewed agenda of international
cooperat ion  and  encouraged  a  r i s ing
transnational  civil  society.
Yet the limits of the globalist consensus quickly
emerged  and  soon  after  1989,  new  “walls”  –
sometime  called  “barriers”  or  “fences”  -  were
being erected: between Israel and the Gaza strip
as early as 1994, between Mexico and the United
States,  following the Secure Fence Act of 2006,
and in the wake of  wars in Iraq,  Afghanistan,
Syria  and  throughout  the  Middle  East,  others
soon followed throughout Europe. Thirty years
after  the  Brandenburg  speech,  the  popular
narrative  of  freedom  arising  from  torn  down
walls has lost its appeal. As depicted in the Anaïs
Mitchell  song (“Why We Build the Wall”),  the
idea of  freedom seems now to  be  intrinsically
linked  to  a  Three-Little-Pigs-like  tale  of
construction  of  ever  thicker  and  stronger
barricades against a Big Bad Wolf impersonating
a  myr iad  o f  pe rce ived  th rea t s ,  f rom
undocumented  workers  to  would-be  terrorists.
US president Donald Trump, putative leader of
this  redefined  “free  world”  entered  the
inter/national stage presenting himself as a wall-
builder, visualizing a new America nestled in a
web of real and metaphorical borders.
The pendulum swing from one Republican US
president’s  discourse  to  another  –  from  wall-
demolisher  Reagan to wall-builder  Trump – is
the most visible, and therefore describable, part
of a movement whose depth and complexity are
still puzzling most analysts, social scientists and
political commentators alike. How can one define
Trumpism  beyond  the  outer  features  of  one
incessantly  gesticulating  larger  than  life
character? 1  Is  i t  populism,  ur-fascism,
(neo)nationalism,  paleoconservatism? And how
is it related to the general far-right movements of
societies and governments that this decade has
been witnessing, notably in the seemingly well-
established  democracies,  not  only  in  North
America, but throughout Europe, Latin America
and East Asia?2 Addressing in depth the global
dimensions of this issue is beyond the scope of
the present article; but looking at the position of
Japan in this context is a first step towards the
necessary  enterprise  of  connecting  the  dots  of
what appear to be similar movements of counter-
react ion  to  the  post-Cold  War  “happy
globalization”  within  OECD  countries  and
beyond.  Regional  differences,  and  Japan’s
specificity,  notably  its  spearhead  role  in  late
twentieth century globalization, have to be taken
 APJ | JF 15 | 10 | 1
3
into  account,  lest  one  reduces  the  present
situation to a “Western” problem.3  A Western-
centric  approach  would  be  particularly
paradoxical here as the general counter-reaction
to  globalization  is  as  “global”  as  what  it  is
reacting to. However the manifestations of that
trend around the world are diverse, highlighting
the  many-faceted  movement  that  has  pushed
forward leaders as different – yet by no means
unrelated  –  as  Donald  Trump,  Viktor  Orban,
Vladimir  Putin,  Recep  Tayyip  Erdogan,
Narendra  Modi,  Rodrigo  Duterte,  and  Abe
Shinzō.
Craving for the Nation?
Globalization  fatigue  is  clearly  an  important
vehicle for the rightist movements that have been
increasingly  visible  since  the  beginning  of  the
new millennium around  the  world,  but  other
factors are also at play and vary from one region
to another. The “anti-establishment” mood that
has fed the rise to power of Donald Trump is also
present  in  a  number of  European countries  as
well as at the continental level, where it is either
directed against  national  elites  or  the so-called
“Brussels  technocrats”  (an  establishment  of  its
own, whose members are not necessarily part of
the national ones).  That mood is not absent in
East  Asia  –  it  accompanied  Rodrigo  Duterte’s
trajectory in particular4  – but it has not been a
major component of the development of rightist
movements that this region has been witnessing
since the early 2000s. At least until the rise and
fall  of  Park Geun-hye,  “populism” was not an
accurate  characterization  of  South  Korean
politics:  new  far-rightist  currents  were
nonetheless  developing,  notably  in  the  digital
public  space  as  illustrated  by  the  growing
political  influence  of  the  ultra-conservative
website  Ilbe.  Likewise  in  Japan,  it  was  not  an
“anti-establishment” impetus that  triggered the
rightist turn of the new millennium, a political
change  that  saw  the  establishment  of  Nippon
Kaigi, the Japan Conference5, now the main non-
party  organization  for  the  promotion  of
aggressive nationalism and the most influential
Japanese political lobby, with deep ties to Prime
Minister Abe and the ruling Liberal Democratic
Party.
A book titled the Nippon Kaigi no
Jinmyaku published in 2016 detailing
the expansive network of the
organization that include prominent
politicians and religious figures.
 APJ | JF 15 | 10 | 1
4
“Neo-nationalism” or  the “rise  of  nationalism”
are the terms that have been most often used to
describe  the  currents  that  have  appeared  in
Northeast Asia after a decade or so of confidence
in a happy globalization.6 It was in Japan that the
euphoric fall-of-all-walls narrative, reinforced by,
among others, an “end-of-history” fantasy, had
the strongest echo. In South Korea, the stubborn
reality  of  the  national  division  constituted  a
caveat for the reception of that narrative (while
other realities were at play in North Korea). And
although China’s “reform and opening policy”,
launched a decade before the official end of the
Cold War, contributed in very tangible ways to
the  interpenetration  of  the  world’s  economies,
the actual endorsement of the “fall-of-all-walls”
discourse would have been clearly at odds with
Beijing politics.  But in Japan this was the time
when commentators such as Kenichi Ohmae and
his “borderless world”7 vision would dominate a
mains t ream  publ i c  debate  where  the
obsolescence  of  the  nation-state  was  actually
envisioned. In the last decade of the 20th century,
nationalism,  even  its  mildest  expressions  —
whether  one  calls  i t  “banal”  or  “petit”
nationalism8  —  was  not  in  vogue  within  the
expanding  group  of  self-defined  liberal
democratic societies, of which Japan had been a
decades-old member.
The  1990s  in  Japan  also  witnessed  the  first
parliamentary defeat of the Jimintō, the Liberal
Democratic Party that had held power since 1955
with  the  help  of  Cold  War  geopolitics.  The
seemingly immutable  conservative rules  of  the
game  started  to  change.  In  1995,  the  Socialist
pr ime  min i s t e r  Murayama  Tomi i ch i
commemorated the 50th anniversary of the end of
the  Pacific  War  with  a  speech  that  was  the
strongest invitation to self-reflection on Japanese
colonialism and war ever  given by a  Japanese
head  of  government.  Two  years  earlier,  the
Conservative chief cabinet secretary Kōno Yōhei
provided a statement on wartime sexual slavery
that  constituted a  milestone in  the  recognition
process of the Japanese state’s responsibility for
crimes against humanity committed during the
Pacific  War.  Yet  a  decade  later  a  new  mood
prevailed:  the  openness  about  historical
responsibi l i ty  was  undermined  by  an
increasingly  affirmative  nationalism  conveyed
both by the Japanese government and the society
at  large.  With  the  entry  of  “neo-nationalism”,
gone were the days when the manifestations of
the Japanese far right were confined to the ugly
folklore  of  a  few  black  trucks  blaring  in  the
streets of Tokyo. What happened, and what was
at stake? The strengthening of rightist  currents
and  their  pervasiveness  within  Japanese
mainstream  politics  reflected  —  as  unfolding
political transformations around the world have
since shown — a much larger, global, trend. But
in Japan, as well as in China and for some time in
South Korea, “history”, rather than the “liberal
establishment”, has been the locus of the growing
malaise,  and  consequential  tensions.  The
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rejection of foreignness within Northeast Asian
societies  has  also  been  more  decisively
determined  by  historical  controversies  than
actual  border-related  policies.
Histories of Lost Self
Fear of the “Other” mixed with a longing for a
“pure  Self”  is  a  well-known  nutrient  for  the
steady growth of nationalism in its most extreme
forms. Anti-immigrant discourses in Europe and
in the United States provide ample space for the
expression of xenophobia and, more generally, of
angst towards everything foreign including, but
not limited to, the human “Other”. In Japan, the
recent increase in the flux of foreigners entering
the  country  –  still  minimal  compared  to
immigration  in  Western  Europe  and  North
America9 – has also inspired nationalist rhetoric,
but  mainly  towards  historical  “adversaries”,
echoing in some ways the development of anti-
China and anti-Korea feelings in the Meiji  era.
Yet the discourse of nationalist trends that have
become  conspicuously  visible  on  the  Japanese
mainstream  political  scene  in  the  early  21st
century seems less concerned with containment
of the Other than the reinvention of Self through
the rewriting of national history. That appeared
clearly already in 1996 with the establishment of
Atarashii  Rekishi  Kyōkasho  Tsukuru  Kai  (or
Tsukuru-kai)  the  Japanese  Society  for  History
Textbook Reform, which claimed to correct the
“decline of national principles.”10 With historical
revisionism at  its  core,  the  deployment  of  the
Tsukuru-kai network hinted at the strength and
structure of the burgeoning neo-nationalism.
 
Joan of Arc and the French National Front- their May 1 st as counter
narrative to the International May Day.
 
History is often invoked and reinterpreted along
romanticized  lines  in  the  making  of  far-right
movements.  The  French  National  Front
celebrates  an  iconic  Joan  of  Arc  “driving  the
English out of France” (“boutons l’Anglais hors de
France”) representing the supposed “purity” of
the nation and its professed immemorial will to
keep  foreigners  away.  From  the  recurrent
references to the lost British empire in the pro-
Brexit campaign to the longing for a White men-
dominated  “great  America”  in  the  Trumpist
rhetoric,  nostalgia for an embellished past  is  a
common feature of extreme nationalist discourse
in Western countries. But it is an element of the
scenery  rather  than  the  scene  itself.  Historical
controversies  do exist  in Europe and in North
America (fed, in particular, by the major powers’
colonial  and/or  imperial  past),  but  do  not
constitute  a  political  resource  comparable  to
what exists today in Japan or, for that matter, in
South Korea or China, as a source of nationalist
mobilization. The pledge to fight a “masochistic
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view  of  history”  –  i.e.  the  “masochism”  of
acknowledging  the  war  crimes  committed  by
Imperial Japan during the Pacific War – has been
at the heart of the movement that first appeared
on the fringe of the Japanese political landscape
and  is  now  taking  center  stage.  It  has  also
revealed  the  strength  of  a  civil  society  that  is
countering this trend.11 In other words historical
claims and controversies shaped from the start
the very fabric of the search for a lost Self. The
“appeal”  of  such  an  agenda  –  reclaiming  the
Nation  by  reclaiming  History  –  is  a  crucial
element  of  the  efficiency of  the  networking of
Tsukuru-kai,  Nippon  Kaigi and  other  historical
revisionist lobbies within Japanese conservative
political  circles,  notably  at  the  parliamentary
level.12  Although  our  focus  here  has  been  on
democratic  societies  in  general  and  Japan  in
particular, one should also note the centrality of
reified  history  in  the  new  national  discourse
among Chinese governmental elites as illustrated
by the repeated call to “never forget the century
of  humiliation”,  a  reference  to  the  period  of
successive foreign invasions that stretches from
the first Opium War in 1839 to the establishment
of the People’s Republic of China in 1949.13 The
PRC’s  entry  into  globalization  and  the
subsequent  weakening  of  the  communist
paradigm has transformed the political resource
provided  by  “history”,  leading  to  a  renewed
stress on China’s victimization at the hands of
Japanese invaders during the Asia-Pacific War14.
Reclaiming 1945
The Japanese nationalist circles’ combat against
the so-called “masochistic view of history” has
centered  on  the  legacy  of  the  International
Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) and is
also  presented  as  the  “Tokyo  Trial  view  of
history”.  Here  Japanese  neo-nationalist
movements converge with neo-Nazi movements
in  Europe  but  also,  paradoxically,  where  they
depart,  as  what  1945  meant  in  Japan  and  in
Germany is comparable only up to a point. What
was supposed to be the twin trial of Nuremberg
in East Asia eventually differed from it in many
ways.  Although  both  trials  were  highly
normative and set invaluable standards for the
management of war and peace and the conduct
of post-conflict actions,15  the IMTFE, because of
certain  of  its  decisions  or,  indeed,  the  non-
decisions that it  backed, created the conditions
for an open-ended debate. At the top of the list of
decisions with deep and long-term effects, was
that of not holding the emperor accountable for
war responsibility. The territories of the Japanese
empire  were  liberated  from  Japanese  colonial
rule,  including  Korea  and  Taiwan,  but  crucial
issues  such as  the  brutal  treatment  of  colonial
subjects  were  pushed  aside  –  revealing  a
legal/political  framework  in  which  the  Allies’
ambivalence towards their own imperial record
was at play. For these and other reasons, such as
the absence of debate about the legality of the
double atomic bombing, the IMTFE engendered
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a feeling of incompleteness, defining a space that
Japanese  pursuers  of  an  unapologetic
nationalism  promptly  occupied. 1 6
The sequence of events between the summer of
1945,  when  the  United  States  obtained  total
surrender  of  the  Japanese Imperial  Army,  and
the winter of 1948, when it became clear that the
work of the IMTFE would be constricted by Cold
War geopolitics, produced conflicting narratives
that continue to inform present day politics in the
Asia-Pacific. A number of individuals who were
arrested in 1945 for committing “crimes against
peace” – class-A war crimes – were eventually
neither  brought  to  trial  nor  acquitted.  Among
and around them were true believers in ultra-
nationalism for whom the opportunity created by
the  lack  of  ethical  clarity  of  the  late  1940s
rea lpo l i t ik  was  no t  an  endgame :  the
rehabilitation  of  pre-War  ideology  was.
Imperialism, and specifically given the emperor
himself  as  the  central  figure  projected by  that
ideology, it is not surprising that the search for
lost imperial authority would become a lasting
pattern of the neo-ultranationalist trend.
In 2005 the Nobel Literature Prize laureate Ōe
Kenzaburō was sued for libel on the ground of an
essay he had published decades earlier, in 1970,
in  which  he  supported  the  well-  documented
assessment that the Imperial Army had coerced
hundreds of civilians on the islands of Okinawa
to  commit  suicide  at  the  end  of  the  Pacific
War.17  The  plaintiffs  were  two former  soldiers
posted in Okinawa in 1945, who quickly received
the support of Jiyūshugi Shikan Kenkyūkai, the
Study  Group  for  a  Liberal  View  of  History,
another revisionist association, as well as that of
the writer Sono Ayako. The latter had written an
essay  a  few  years  after  Ōe’s  publication,
denouncing  the  “myth”  of  the  forced  mass
suicides of Okinawan civilians during the Battle
of Okinawa, asserting that those deaths had in
fact  been voluntary acts of  “love” towards the
emperor and the Japanese nation.18 Noteworthy
here is not only the striking obsession with pre-
war imperial thinking, but also the timing of the
judicial attack on Ōe. Although the search for lost
imperial  authority  has  been  on  from the  very
moment  Hirohito  was de-sanctified during the
US occupation, and that search had never ceased
in the following decades as indicated by Sono’s
publication, it is only since the beginning of the
new  millennium  that  the  aggressive  historical
revisionism it generates has found the space in
the Japanese political landscape to fully express
itself.  The  appointment,  in  August  2016  of  a
hardline nationalist such as Inada Tomomi – who
openly  supported  the  lawsuit  against  Oe  ten
years  earlier  -  as  Abe  Shinzô’s  new  defense
minister,  illustrates  how  powerful  that
movement  had  become.
Datsu-A  / “Leaving Asia”
Political  wrangling  and  the  magical-realist-like
occurrences brought about by the complexities of
geopolitics such as those of Northeast Asia in the
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late 1940s can be abundantly illustrated by the
mutations that took place in Japan during that
decade.  Consider  the  emperor’s  change  of
apparel,  from uniformed head of  a  belligerent
power  to  a  suit  symbolic  of  a  peace-loving
country,  a  change  as  instantaneous  and
stupefying  as  a  clever  hikinuki,  the  onstage
costume change technique in the kabuki theater.
Along  with  this  transformation  came  that  of
Japan’s  geo-cultural  location  that  moved
overnight from being the “roof of Asia” – i.e. the
imperial power on the Asian continent, according
to the hakkō ichiu / “all the world under one roof”
wartime vision – to becoming a member of the
rising Pacific Community, de facto cut off from
its  continental  neighbors,  whose main,  and for
sometime  only,  partner  was  the  occupying
power, the United States. One lasting legacy of
that transformation is the contrast between the
roughly  consensual  discourse  shared –  despite
increasing points of friction19 – by Japan and the
US on the Pacific War, on the one hand, and the
sheer lack of common narrative on this period
among the Northeast Asian nations, on the other.
The  debate  over  Japan’s  position  within  the
region  is  a  recurring  one  and  the  question
whether the Japanese government was “leaving
Asia”  has  been  addressed  more  than  once  by
conservative  leaders,  especially  since  Koizumi
Junichirō’s premiership at the start of the 2000s20.
The  reference  to  the  late  19th  century  Datsu-A
Nyū-Ō/”Leave Asia and Join the West” slogan is
anachronistic  yet  significant.  This  slogan  was
coined  by  one  of  the  leading  figures  of  the
Westernization  movement  of  the  Meiji  era,
Fukuzawa Yukichi,  at  a  time when something
like  an  East  Asian  system  of  international
relations  did  exist.  As  historian  Hamashita
Takeshi  has  pointed  out,  the  organizational
structure centered around China, the Sino-centric
system  that  the  European  imperial  powers
encountered  in  the  early  19 th  century,  was
embattled yet retained a certain coherence across
East  Asia,  being  understand  by  contemporary
elites not just as “their” world, but “the” world21.
Today the region toward which Japan is turning
its back is deeply divided. The violent turn that
the Meiji government took in the later part of the
19th century, in the spirit of Fukuzawa’s famous
slogan, created indeed a disruption from which
the region, along with other traumas, never fully
recovered  as  political  cooperation  within
Northeast Asia has been weak at best – the first
and most brutal sign of this disruption being the
1894-95 Sino-Japanese War, when China not only
was defeated by its former vassal but forced to
renounce its suzerainty over Korea.
Yet  regionalism  and,  more  to  the  point,  a
conception of East Asian solidarity in the form of
Pan-Asianism did emerge from the shambles of
the  Sinocentric  system  at  the  end  of  the  19th
century.22 That idea was supported by reformers
including  Okakura  Tenshin  in  Japan,  Kim
Okkyun in Korea and Sun Yat-sen in China, and
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expressed  the  vision  of  a  common/regional
response to the challenge of modernization that
derived from European domination. The idea of
the nation-state and of nationalism, that was part
and parcel of the Western challenge, eventually
became  the  main  template  for  transformation,
and  as  it  grew stronger,  it  overshadowed the
discourse and hopes conveyed by the regional
vision (a trend not dissimilar, albeit in a different
socio-historical  context,  to  the  rise  of  modern
nationalism  in  Europe  at  the  turn  of  the  20th
century  and  the  exhaustion  of  the  late  19 th
century European ideal.23)
The spirit of regional solidarity was re-invented
and  was  briefly  alive  during  the  decade  that
followed the end of the Cold War. Or rather, one
should  say,  the  crumbling  of  the  international
bipolar order but not the end of the Cold War
everywhere in the world, as important divisions
in East Asia – North-South Korea, PRC-Taiwan –
were not eliminated by the fall of the Berlin Wall
and disintegration of  the  Soviet  Union.  It  was
precisely  Kim  Dae-jung,  former  dissident  and
president of South Korea who championed the
idea of an East Asia Summit in 1999, hoping to
create a vehicle for the end of the Korean War
and normalization of relations between the two
Koreas.  The  East  Asia  Summit  eventually
materialized in 2005: but by this time the mood
for regional  friendship was turning sour again
and  historical  controversies  in  Northeast  Asia
soon flared up.
After  1989  the  Northeast  Asian  version of  the
“Iron Curtain” did not disappear: there remains a
dividing line running from the Taiwan Strait, to
the 38th parallel on the Korean peninsula, up to
the sea stretch between Hokkaido and the Kuril
islands (Japan and Russia being still technically
at war in the absence of a peace treaty following
the Pacific War). Walls, whether made of water
or of  empty land,  are now stronger and more
contentious than ever, maintaining fault lines to
which the territorial fights around the islets in the
South  China  Sea,  East  China  Sea  and  Sea  of
Japan/East Sea add complications. Less than two
decades  after  Kim  Dae-jung  formulated  his
vision for regional cooperation,  Northeast  Asia
looks dangerously fractured. The new “leaving
Asia” mood in Japan shares with the late 19th
century one, a deep uneasiness in Sino-Japanese
relations and the illusion on Tokyo’s  side that
such a close and important neighbor as China can
somehow be  ignored.  The  nationalistic  revival
within  which  this  mood  is  resurfacing  is,
however,  far  from being  limited  to  Japan;  the
whole  of  Northeast  Asia  seems  indeed  to  be
engulfed  by  a  particularly  pernicious  form  of
nationalism,  with  tangible  negative  impact  on
transnational exchanges, and leaving little, if any,
room for regional cooperation.
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Map of the Kuril Island chain detailing pre-
and post-WWII boundaries.
The Assault of Nationalisms on Humanity
“Nationalism  in  East  Asia  is  on  a  collision
course”, remarked historian Hasegawa Tsuyoshi
and  political  scientist  Togo  Kazuhiko  in  their
edited volume on the “specter of memories of the
past” that is presently haunting the region.24 The
authors argue that  the nationalistic  trends that
have appeared in Northeast Asia are the result of
the  end  of  the  Cold  War  and  the  subsequent
search for a new source of political legitimacy in
the PRC, South Korea and Japan – an argument
that  is  convincing  enough,  although  it  is
oblivious to the fact that the divisions that have
been attributed to the Cold War (inter-Korean,
inter-Chinese and Russo-Japanese) have not been
resolved. It does not explain either why during
the first decade following the fall of the Berlin
Wall  and  the  collapse  of  communist  regimes
across  Eastern  Europe,  regional  dialogue  was
more common in Northeast Asia than the present
nationalistic  posturing.  Here  as  elsewhere,  a
decade of optimistic, often zealous, globalism has
been followed by a general move towards wall-
building  and  mind-closing,  and  various
expressions  of  fear  of  the  Other.  What  sets
Northeast  Asia  apart  is  indeed  the  weight  of
historical  controversies  that  both  reflect  and
amplify  the  new  nationalism.  The  negative
impact  of  those  controversies  on  regional
cooperation is hardly debatable. What should be
acknowledged  now  is  the  particularly  toxic
dimension of these nationalistic currents from the
perspective of  inter-national  coexistence,  peace,
and, more deeply, that of humanism.
The  toxicity  of  the  present  nationalism  in
Northeast Asia is especially clear in the case of
the  unresolved issue  of  the  so-called  “comfort
women” (ianfu), the official name used by Japan’s
Imperial Army to designate the girls and women
it used as sexual slaves during the Pacific War.
The  fact  that  the  problem  of  the  “comfort
women”  is  a  moral  issue  of  global  scope,  as
opposed to a local or national question, should be
as indisputable as the fact that it refers to a crime
against humanity. Yet the way this problem has
been  tackled  by  neo-nationalists  on  all  sides,
tends  to  obscure  this  fundamental  dimension.
The seeds of the confusion were actually planted
at the very beginning, right after the end of the
War.  Although  documentation  on  “comfort
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women” was available to the IMTFE in 1946, the
issue was not addressed during the Tokyo Trial.
Nor  were  cases  of  mass  rape  ra ised  at
Nuremberg. Mass violence against women and
gender-related  violence  were  de  facto  not  a
priority  of  what  was  then  called  international
justice and consequently not fully investigated.
The  Tokyo  and  Nuremberg  Trials  did  put
forward the notion of  crime against  humanity,
but as a matter of fact,  only half  of the actual
human  population  was  taken  into  account  in
defining the said humanity.25
From the beginning, there was confusion as to
whether the plight of “comfort women” would
be viewed as a crime against humanity or against
citizens  of  specific  nations.  The  only  trial
concerning  “comfort  women”  that  took  place
after the War was a local one: that of the Batavia
Temporary  Court  Martial  held  by  the  Dutch
authorities  in 1948 which condemned Japanese
officers  for  “forced  prostitution”  of  Dutch
women in Indonesia,  whereas the much larger
number of Indonesian women who were victims
of the same crime were conspicuously ignored.
This  ambivalent  legacy  has  been  further
complicated by rising nationalisms in Northeast
Asia. When the “comfort women” issue emerged
in  the  public  sphere  in  the  early  1990s,  the
contradiction between a globally oriented and a
national(istic)  definition  of  the  identity  of  the
victims was almost immediately at play. One the
one  hand,  transnational  citizen  movements,
especially transnational feminism with Japanese
feminists such as Matsui Yayoi and the Women’s
Active  Museum  for  War  and  Peace  (WAM)
playing  a  leading  role,  offered  a  global
understanding of the problem. They highlighted
the  suffering  and  humiliation  of  girls  and
women, i.e. addressing this group of beings that
constitutes one half of humanity.  On the other
hand,  international  state-to-state  discussion,
notably that in Japan, focused on national shame
and tended to lose sight of the actual gendered
victims.
Coming back to  the present  era  of  heightened
nationalism, the notion of human dignity appears
more than ever threatened by narrowly defined
national  pride.  This  is  reflected  in  the  deep
ambivalence  of  the  Korean  states  towards  the
reality  of  the  suffering  of  individual  “comfort
women.”26  Increasingly,  the  focus  is  put  on
national pride, as illustrated in April 2014 when
the  North  Korean  government  called  South
Korean  president  Park  Geun-hye  the  United
States’ “dirty comfort woman” – an accusation of
“selling  out”  the  Korean  nation  to  American
interests that implicitly supported the Japanese
revisionist  argument  that  “comfort  women”
designated  not  victims  of  sexual  slavery  but
contemptible  prostitutes.  In  the  PRC,  the
conflation,  in  official  discourse,  between  the
notion  of  “national  humiliation”  and  the
condemnation  of  the  Rape  of  Nanking,  where
gendered  mass  violence  also  occurred,  further
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illustrates  how  obsession  with  national  pride
translates  into  loss  of  sight  of  human  beings,
human dignity and the universal individual that
is  part  of  humanity.  The  humiliation  and
suffering of individual victims of war crimes is
arguably  better  recognized  by  Korean  and
Chinese  nationalist  rhetoric  than  by  Japanese
revisionism  –  which  denies  the  reality  of  the
crimes altogether  –  yet  often in  an alarmingly
superficial manner. As Hasegawa Tsuyoshi and
Togo  Kazuhiko  have  argued,27  the  end  of  the
international bipolar order in 1989 triggered the
expression  of  people’s  memories  — especially
memories pertaining to crimes against humanity
— that  had  previously  been  silenced.  But  the
acknowledgement  of  those  memories  was
quickly  caught  within  the  conflicting  logics  of
transnational/global versus national approaches.
The Tokyo Trial  legacy is  undeniably a mixed
bag. As mentioned earlier, its contribution to the
establishment of a progressive legal international
framework  for  conflict  and  post-conflict
management  is  tangible.  But  its  shortcomings
have  a  lasting  effect  that  is  equally  tangible,
maintaining  a  space  of  both  vindication  and
contest.  The  international  system  that  was
produced at the same time, in the wake of World
War  Two,  and  centered  around  the  United
Nations,  also had limitations,  starting with the
decision  to  give  to  five  victorious  states,  the
members  of  the Security  Council  who enjoyed
veto power, the universal and exclusive right to
authorize or veto war. The representativeness of
this  institution  (along with  others  such  as  the
executive  board  of  the  IMF),  is  increasingly
contested by countries that feel understandably
under-represented,  such  as  Brazil,  India,
Germany, Japan and South Africa. Yet the United
Nations  is  the  only  international  body  that
gathers  (almost)  all  the countries  of  the world
and  whose  fundamental  hypothesis  is  the
possibility of global cooperation. This hypothesis
has  always  been  hopeful,  or  as  International
Relations theory would put it, it derives from an
idealist  view of world order in the face of the
selfish nature of states. But world politics can be
more or less propitious for global  cooperation,
and the worldwide heightening of nationalism,
including,  and  especially,  within  democratic
societies  is  clearly  a  negative.
Japanese nationalism matters too
Japan’s  participation  in  the  general  trend  of
rising nationalism and far-right leaning can be
interpreted in multiple ways. Japan is among a
very limited number of countries in the world
that has taken pacifism seriously and indeed has
made  a  pacifist  contribution  to  international
affairs.  Therefore  any  break  from this  seventy
year  legacy  could  be  interpreted  as  patent
revisionism.  Prime  Minister  Abe  Shinzō,  has
called for the elimination of the “anti-war” article
9  of  its  Constitution.  Reinterpretation  of  the
fundamental  law  was  approved  by  the
Parliament  in  September  2015  over  strong
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resistance from opposition parties and Japanese
citizen movements that revealed the depth of a
decades-old  pacifism,  rooted  at  every  level  of
society,  from  family  and  school  to  local
communities.  Yet  what  should  be  noted  here
from a global perspective is that the danger of
ransacking this unique pacifist legacy comes both
from within and outside Japan. Donald Trump’s
East  Asia  policy,  however  volatile,  even
incoherent,  clearly  points  in  the  direction of  a
militarily  more  robust  nation  making  greater
financial  and  military  contributions  to  US
agendas throughout the world. In the beginning
of the millennium the mere vision of Japanese
naval vessels in the seas of Asia – whatever their
actual purpose,  including logistical  support for
NATO operations – was presented in European
media  as  a  troubling  resurrection  of  Japan’s
imperial  past.  Fifteen  years  later,  pleading  for
Japan (and Germany)’s right to wage war is not a
radical opinion.28 This new tolerance in the West
for what politician Ozawa Ichirō famously called
a “normal Japan,”29 a nation with an army of its
own  unencumbered  by  const i tut ional
restrictions,  is  part  of  US  and  European
reinterpretation  of  the  post-1945  era,  i.e.  the
rationalization  for  a  vision  of  global  security
cooperation.  Western  advocates  of  a  “normal
Japan” are not suggesting, for instance, that the
term “enemy state” that still defines Japan in the
United Nations Charter should be deleted. But
nor are they expressing concern that the push for
rearmament within Japan is directly linked with
the  rise  of  ultra-nationalism.  Indeed,  with
international  attention  focused  on  China  and
Korea, there is little indication in public discourse
that the changing Japanese geopolitical landscape
has  any  impact  on  the  normative  state  of  the
world or indeed that it matters at all.
It took the pro-Brexit vote in the United Kingdom
to launch a debate in Europe about the sweeping
nationalist  current  on  the  continent:  yet  this
current  had  been  prospering  and  growing  for
several years, notably in Eastern Europe. It took
the  election  of  Donald  Trump  in  the  United
States  to  trigger  a  global  conversation  on  the
deep rightist turn of democratic societies around
the world; yet this transformation had been on
full  display  in  parts  of  Asia  for  more  than  a
decade. The Trump’s administration’s attacks on
the media, as several NGOs have rightly pointed
out,30  is  indicative  of  declining  standards  of
freedom that affect not just the United States, but
more broadly the global state of democracy. The
Abe Shinzō government has been attacking the
media for a longer time. Even though this trend
has  been  well  documented  by  scholars,31  and
even reported in the US and European press, it
has  not  been  widely  perceived  as  a  threat  to
democracy  at  a  global  level.  Likewise  the
pressure of ultra-conservatism on universities in
the United States and in Europe – to which arts
and humanities  are particularly vulnerable but
entire institutions such as the Central European
University  of  Budapest  may  be  affected32  -  is
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commonly understood as  a  threat  to  academic
liberties  around the world.  The significance of
similar pressure on Japanese universities is not
always comprehended.33 One can only hope that
Japan,  a long  with  other  non-Western
democracies will now be fully part of the picture.
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